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ESSAY
"We Are an Independent Nation":
A History of Iroquois Sovereignty
MARY DRUKE BECKERt
The Iroquois have asserted their sovereignty contin-
uously throughout history. Despite this, much ambiguity
surrounds Iroquois sovereignty. For example, during the
period of British and French colonialism, each power
claimed dominance over the Iroquois! During the modern
period, attempts have been made to relegate them to a
quasi-sovereign status.2 Throughout their history, the
Iroquois have been considered free and independent people,
t Mary Druke Becker is a Research Associate of the Iroquois Indian Museum in
Howes Cave, New York. She serves as an independent research consultant and
writes for publication. She received her Ph.D. in anthropology from the
University of Chicago in 1982, and is Associate Editor of Iroquois Indians: A
Documentary History, the microfilm compilation of documents pertaining to
Iroquois treaties published through the Newberry library in 1985. This Essay
was originally delivered as a speech on March 20, 1998 at the Buffalo Law
Review Symposium entitled Law, Sovereignty and Tribal Governance: The
Iroquois Confederacy.
1. See Howard Berman, Perspectives on American Indian Sovereignty and
International Law, 1600-1776, in EXILED IN THE LAND OF THE FREE: DEMOCRACY,
INDIAN NATIONS, AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 100, 141-42 (Chief Oren Lyons &
John Mohawk eds., 1992) [hereinafter EXILED].
2. See HELEN M. UPTON, THE EVERETT REPORT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE:
THE INDIANS OF NEWYORK, 139-61 (1980); Jack Campisi, National Policy, State's
Rights, and Indian Sovereignty: The Case of the New York Iroquois, in EX-
TENDING THE RAFTERS: INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACHES TO IROQUOIAN STUDIES
100 (Michael K. Foster et al. eds., 1984) [hereinafter IROQUOIAN STUDIES].
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subjects, protectorates of other powers, dependent domestic
nations, wards and equal to " 'the most powerful nation in
the world [the United States] and the richest state in the
union [New York State].' "' This Essay will explore Iroquois
assertions of sovereignty within the context of international
relations.
Although much has been written about Iroquois sov-
ereignty,4 my intent is not to repeat prior work. I hope to
cast a different light on the subject by focusing on its
cultural background.
The ambiguity surrounding Iroquois sovereignty results
from the many reconfigurations of players among both the
Iroquois and Euro-Americans.5 One must understand the
nature of Iroquois' relationships with other nations in order
to establish a framework of Iroquois sovereignty assertions
and Euro-American reactions to them.
Prior to the arrival of Europeans in North America,
individual Iroquoian nations had been interacting
internationally. They formed a League, commonly referred
to as the Haudenosaunee.6  This was initially a
confederation of five individual, independent nations: the
Mohawk, the Oneida, the Onondaga, the Cayuga and the
Seneca. The Tuscarora joined the League sometime during
3. See UPTON, supra note 2, at 145 (quoting Felix Cohen, Assistant Solicitor
of the Department of the Interior).
4. See generally Berman, Perspectives on American Indian Sovereignty and
International Law: 1600-1776, in EXILED, supra note 1, at 125-88; Jack
Campisi, National Policy, State's Rights, and Indian Sovereignty: The Case of
New York Iroquois, in IROQUOIAN STUDIES, supra note 2, at 95-108; LAURENCE
M. HAUPTMAN, THE IROQUOIS AND THE NEW DEAL 1-18 (1981); Richard Hill,
Continuity of Haudenosaunee Government, in INDIAN ROOTS OF AMERICAN
DEMOCRACY 166-75 (Jose Barreiro ed., 1992); Kahn-Tineta Horn, Beyond Oka:
Dimensions of Mohawk Sovereignty, 35 STUD. POL. ECON. 29 (1991); GAIL H.
LANDSMAN, SOVEREIGNTY AND SYMBOL: INDIAN-WHITE CONFLICT AT GANIENKEH
(1988); John C. Mohawk, Indian Economic Development: An Evolving Concept of
Sovereignty, 39 BUFF. L. REV. 495, 495-506 (1991); Irving Powless, Jr., The
Sovereignty and Land Rights of the Haudenosaunee, in IROQUOIS LAND CLAIMS,
155-61 (Christopher Vecsey & William A. Starna eds., 1988).
5. Players include the Iroquois confederate council, each of the individual
nations-Mohawk, Oneida, Onondaga, Cayuga, Seneca, Tuscarora-individual
villages and communities, Dutch, English, French colonial governments,
individual colonial or provincial governments, federal governments of the
United States and Canada and individual states and provinces.
6. There is much controversy over the date of the origin of the League of the
Iroquois. Dating ranges from 1142 to the early to mid-sixteenth century. There
seems to be agreement, however, that it was in place before contact with
Europeans. See DEAN SNOW, THE IROQUOIS 57-60 (1994).
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the first two decades of the eighteenth century. Each nation
of the League, despite its common origins and its eventual
alliance with the others, is in essence distinct, not only in
language, but in national experience. The fact that the six
nations were at one time completely independent, even to
the point that they warred with one another, contributed a
unique characteristic to the nature of the confederacy they
later formed. In entering into the alliance, none of the six
nations lost its identity as an individual nation.
7
Segmentation allows independence to be maintained while
unity is fostered.8
The segmentation in Iroquois culture has its bases in
local kinship relations, traditionally within the matrilineal
clan. Clans are then intertwined with one another in
reciprocal relationships.9 A number of clans form one half
(one moiety) with reciprocal relations to members of the
remaining clans who form the other half (the other moiety)
of the local entity. These relationships are then extended
from one village to another within a nation and from one
nation to another on the confederate level. Members of a
clan are kinsmen of members of the same clan within the
village, the nation and the confederacy. °
These relationships provide interlocking links among
units. At the same time, each retains its distinctiveness.
This can best be seen on the confederate level in cases
where all nations do not agree or in those cases in which
one nation insists that it cannot negotiate for others. It can
also be seen in the segmentation of council procedures. It is
necessary for the members of one clan, village or nation to
decide an issue for themselves, before joining into
7. See William N. Fenton, The Concept of Locality and the Program of
Iroquois Research, in SYMPOSIUM ON LOCAL Di-ERSITY IN IROQUOIS CULTURE 1-12
(William N. Fenton ed., 1951).
8. The present tense is used, except when discussing specific historical data,
to describe processes that have been used by traditional Iroquois through time.
9. See WILLIAM N. FENTON, THE GREAT TREE AND THE LONGHOUSE: A
POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE IROQUOIS CONFEDERACY 27-29 (1998); see also LEWIS
H. MORGAN, LEAGUE OF THE IROQUOIS 78-103 (1962); William N. Fenton,
Northern Iroquoian Culture Patterns, in 15 HANDBOOK OF NORTH AMERICAN
INDIANS 312-14 (Bruce G. Trigger ed., & William C. Sturtevant gen. ed., 1978).
10. See generally J.N.B. Hewitt, The Requickening Address of the Iroquois
Condolence Council, 34 J. WASH. ACAD. SCI. 65, 65-85 (1944) (describing the
activities of the Condolence Council as an illustration of how meshing kinship
with ritual reinforces and provides structure for the relationships between
members of a clan).
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negotiations with other clans, villages or nations in the
League.
In Iroquois politics, the process of careful deliberations
in the search for consensus facilitates the identification of
valued alternatives, as individual clans, villages and
nations deliberate matters before proceeding to decide with
others. Historically, the ideal of consensus is achieved after
alternatives for action have been considered and are recon-
ciled. In cases where consensus is not achieved, the council
fire is temporarily covered, negotiations on the matter cease
and each party withdraws to act as it sees fit."
While it is clear that the confederacy has existed in
some form throughout history, data on the autonomy of
individual nations within it" is often disturbing to people
who either gloss over them or claim that the League was a
fractured political system." However, the autonomy or
independence of the individual nations within the confed-
eracy is an integral part of the confederate structure that
allows for diversity as well as unity and autonomy as well
as confederation and must be recognized as such.
The meshing of autonomy with confederation is a fun-
damental characteristic of the League. It is important in
appreciating Iroquois assertions of sovereignty and
realizing their full import within multinational contexts in
which non-Iroquois, particularly non-Indians, were in-
volved. It also allows one to see the historical bases for
relations among Iroquois people. Today, Iroquois commun-
ities rest claims of sovereignty over land on treaty relations
11. See Mary A. Druke, Structure and Meanings of Leadership Among the
Mohawk and Oneida During the Mid-Eighteenth Century 251-52 (1981)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago) (on file with author and
the University of Chicago). The Iroquois who have an elective system of
government, such as the Seneca Nation after 1948, table the matter, rather
than cover the council fire.
12. See generally THE LIVINGINSTON INDIAN RECORDS, 1661-1723; MORGAN,
supra note 9, at 93-106; Jack Campisi, National Policy, State's Rights, and
Indian Sovereignty: The Case of the New York Iroquois, in IROQUOIAN STUDIES,
supra note 2, at 97-98 (noting examples from the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries).
13. See generally GEORGE T. HUNT, THE WARS OF THE IROQUOIS: A STUDY OF
INTERTRIBAL TRADE RELATIONS 9, 11 (1940); Charles H. McIilwain, Introduction
to AN ABRIDGEMENT OF THE INDIAN AFFAIRS TRANSACTED IN THE COLONY OF NEW
YORK FROM THE YEAR 1678 TO THE YEAR 1751 (Peter Wraxell ed., 1915); BARBARA
GRAYMONT, THE IROQUOIS IN AMERICAN REVOLUTION 23-25 (1972); WILLIAM T.
HAGAN, LONGHOUSE DIPLOMACY AND FRONTIER WARFARE 12, 55-56 (1976).
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of the late eighteenth century confederacy, notably those at
Fort Stanwix in 1784 and Canandaigua in 1794, as they
should. 4 The deep historical roots of Iroquois policy in the
confederacy have contributed toward fostering the diversity
now found among the Iroquois.
There are fifty chiefs in the Iroquois confederacy,
commonly called sachems. Ideally, these men are
matrilineal descendants of the fifty people who were chiefs
during the formation of the confederacy. A grouping of
wampum strings which are formed from shell beads strung
together symbolizes the sachems. Each string represents
one of the chiefs of the League, and each is linked to the
others. It is significant that this symbol is not simply a
circle of wampum. Instead, it consists of distinct strings,
one for each chief, which are linked together to form a
circle, the confederacy. Another symbol of Iroquois alliance
is the linking of arms, the adding of another's power to
oneself.15  This image of linked arms symbolizes
relationships within the Iroquois confederacy, as well as
those between the confederacy and other nations.
Therefore, when contact with Euro-Americans began, the
Iroquois had a model for establishing working relationships
between the two cultures.
One of the earliest written accounts of treaty councils
between the Iroquois and other nations is that of the
transactions at Three Rivers in July and September 1645.16
At this conference the Iroquois speaker
took hold of a Frenchman, placed his arm within his, and with his
other arm he clasped that of an Algonquin. Having thus joined
themselves to them, 'Here,' he said, 'is the knot that binds us
inseparably; nothing can part us .... Even if the lightening were
to fall upon us, it could not separate us; for, if it cuts off the arm
that holds you to us, we will at once seize each other by the [other]
arm.' And thereupon he turned around, and caught the
Frenchman and Algonquin by their two arms-holding them so
14. See Treaty with the Six Nations at Fort Stanwix, Oct. 22, 1784, 7 Stat.
15; Treaty with the Six Nations (at Canandaigua), Nov. 11, 1794, 7 Stat. 45. See
generally IROQUOIS RELATIONS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 312-19, 353-54
(Francis Jennings & William Fenton eds., 1985).
15. See J.N.B. Hewitt, Orenda and a Definition of Religion, 4 AM.
ANTHROPOLOGIST 33, 41 (1902).
16. 27 JESUIT RELATIONS AND ALLIED DOCUMENTS 247-305 (Reuben G.
Thwaites ed., 1898) [hereinafter JESUIT RELATIONS].
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closely that he seemed unwilling ever to leave them.
17
This is an image that is echoed in Iroquois international
relations during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.
Note that the speaker caught the arm of the Frenchman
and Algonquin separately, treating them as equal parties in
the negotiation.
The imagery of linking units, each distinct and equal, is
also seen in references to chains of friendship. The
Covenant Chain between the English and Iroquois is an
example.18 It was an ongoing alliance between the English
(comprised of individual colonies) and the Iroquois and
allied Indians. The colony of New York attempted to
dominate other colonies such as Virginia and Maryland by
negotiating on their behalf, or insisting that officials of the
other colonies come to Albany to trade with the Iroquois.
Moreover, the colonies tried to negotiate for Indians allied
with them. These efforts were unsuccessful, largely because
the Iroquois insisted that the parties be independent. They
negotiated when convenient with Virginia, Maryland,
Pennsylvania and Massachusetts separately from New
York, and in almost every case insisted that Indian nations
themselves meet with the Iroquois to renew the Covenant
Chain. 9 Although the imagery allowed for two ends of a
chain, each of which might be held by one party, the
relationship between these two parties and other links in
the chain were not ones of subservience, but of the nature of
"first among equals."' This is a traditional Iroquoian
concept personified by the first of the fifty sachems, To-do-
da-ho. As Lewis Henry Morgan wrote while discussing To-
do-d~i-ho, "... the first sachemship was named after him,
and was dignified above the others by special marks and
honors, but such, however, as were in perfect consistency
with an equal distribution of power among all sachems as a
17. Mary A. Druke, Linking Arms: The Structure of Iroquois Intertribal
Diplomacy, in BEYOND THE COVENANT CHAIN: THE 'IROQUOIS AND THEIR
NEIGHBORS IN INDIAN NORTH AMERICA, 1600-1800, at 29 (Daniel K Richter &
James H. Merrel eds., 1987). See also JESUIT RELATIONS, supra note 16, at 261.
18. See generally 8 JAMES ROMEYN BRODHEAD, DOCUMENTS RELATIVE TO THE
COLONIAL HISTORY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 622 (E.B. O'Callaghan ed., 1857)
(describing Iroquois accounts of the Covenant Chain).
19. See FRANCIS JENNINGS, THE AMBIGUOUS IROQUOIS EMPIRE 170-71, 315-16,
356 (1984).
20. See DANIEL K. RICHTER, THE ORDEAL OF THE LONGHOUSE: THE PEOPLES
OF THE IROQUOIS LEAGUE IN THE ERA OF EUROPEAN COLONIZATION 137 (1992).
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body."21 The Iroquois might be viewed as first among the
Indians in the Covenant Chain alliance and New York the
first among the colonists, but neither should supersede, or
dominate, the other parties.
Iroquois relations with New Netherlands during the
seventeenth century from 1609 to 1664 and from 1673 to
1674 centered primarily on trade. During this time, the
Dutch clearly recognized the sovereignty of the Iroquois.
For example, the Dutch West India Company charter
granted the company authority to "enter into treaties and
alliances with the princes and natives of the country."22
Although no territorial title to Iroquois land was claimed by
New Netherlands, land grants were made by the Dutch
after Indian title to the land had been extinguished. Great
Britain followed this practice after its defeat of New
Netherlands." France also negotiated with the Iroquois for
title to land.24 There were, however, many disputes that
arose from the failure of the colonial powers and the Euro-
Americans to understand what the Iroquois meant by
specific land transactions. Many of these touched directly
upon the issue of sovereignty.
For example, the English insisted on ownership of lands
as far west as the Ohio region during negotiations with the
French because the lands had been given to them by the
Indians during a large "cession" in 1701.25 The Iroquois, on
the other hand, regarded this land as having been placed
under the protection of the English. In September of 1726,
three of the five nations, the Onondagas, Cayugas and
Senecas, carefully explained the nature of the supposed
cession, when they confirmed the 1701 grant. Sachems of
the three nations attested that it was made for ".... all the
Said land and Beaver hunting to be Protected & Defended
by his Said Majesty his heirs & Sucessors to and for the use
21. See MORGAN, supra note 9, at 68.
22. See Howard Berman, Perspectives on American Indian Sovereignty and
International Law, 1600-1776, in EXILED, supra note 1, at 135-39.
23. See id. at 145.
24. See id. at 140-45.
25. See id. at 177-78, 182-83. For studies about the 1701 treaty, see Richard
L. Haan, The Problem of Iroquois Neutrality: Suggestions for Revision, 27
ETHNOHISTORY 317-30 (1980); RICHARD AQUILA, THE IROQUOIS RESTORATION: THE
IROQUOIS DIPLOMACY ON THE COLONIAL FRONTIER, 1701-1754, at 85-128 (1983);
J.A. Branddo & William A. Starna, The Treaties of 1701: A Triumph of Iroquois
Diplomacy, 43 ETHNOHISTORY 209-44 (1996).
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of us our heirs & Successors and the said Three nations."26
The Iroquois explained a different type of transaction in
1710; however, this still involved the expectation of aid and
protection. When meeting with Colonial Governor Hunter of
New York, the Iroquois were asked if they wanted English
protection against their enemies, the French and the Indian
allies of France. Governor Hunter promised to send
garrisons for this purpose. As he phrased it, "I desire to
know... if you will be satisfied to have a Garrison Planted
in one or more of your Castles, and a Chapel or Chapells
built there & ye place fortifyed for your defence and
Protection."27 The Indians wholeheartedly agreed." Conflict
arose in some cases where these garrisons turned out to be
English outposts, with English expansion rather than the
welfare of the Indians in mind. This occurred despite what
was articulated by both sides at the conference, that is, that
garrisons would provide military aid to the Indians as
English allies. As Howard Berman has written, "[I]t is quite
clear that the Haudenosaunee regarded 'protection' as a
strictly consensual arrangement for a particular purpose.""0
Despite verbal assertions to the contrary, Indian control
over land was generally accepted by Euro-Americans for
roughly 150 years, well into the 1840s. They continued to
negotiate with the Iroquois for the same land that they
maintained was theirs by virtue of the 1701 cession.
Beginning in the late 1670s, the English and French
began seeking territorial domination over larger and larger
areas of land vis-A-vis one another." Each nation argued
with the other that the Iroquois had agreed to become their
children or subjects. The Iroquois had agreed to use the
Iroquoian term for "father" when addressing Euro-
Americans.3 This term was used because within the
matrilineal Iroquois society a father was an indulgent, not
26. See 5 JAMES ROMEYN BRODHEAD, DOCUIENTS RELATIVE TO THE COLONIAL
HISTORY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 800 (E.B. O'Callaghan ed., 1855).
Throughout the article, the author quotes language in its original usage.
27. See Howard Berman, Perspectives on American Indian Sovereignty and
International Law, 1600-1776, in EXILED, supra note 1, at 221.
28. See id. at 222-23.
29. Id. at 159.
30. See 10 JOHN ROMEYN BRODHEAD, DOCUMENTS RELATIVE TO THE COLONIAL
HISTORY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 290-94 (E.B. O'Callaghan ed., 1855).
31. See generally 4 JOHN ROMEYN BRODHEAD, DOCUmiENTS RELATIVE TO
COLONIAL HISTORY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 279-82 (E.B. O'Callaghan ed.,
1854).
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an authoritarian, figure. The term was commonly used
among Iroquois nations and by Iroquois for other nations
with whom they were in alliance. 2 It implied a reciprocal
relation in which care and aid were provided. It was not one
which implied subordination.
The Iroquois made their definition of these terms clear
to both the French and the English, who acknowledged the
definitions. This can be seen in reports from Iroquoia in the
late winter and early spring of 1699, during which time the
English were trying to prevent the Iroquois from nego-
tiating with the French.3 The Iroquois reported to the Eng-
lish that the French were chiding them because an English-
man had reportedly called them children and referred to
them as little better than slaves. 4 The Iroquois were look-
ing to the English at the time for aid in obtaining prisoners
held by the French. The English had promised to be able to
expeditiously secure the release of the prisoners. Since the
English were not able to do so, the Iroquois proceeded to
secure the release. They clearly stated, through their
speaker Teganissorens, how they had expected it to have
gone:
[L]ast summer when we made our publick proposition to his
ExcellcY we did expect that His ExcelcY would have propounded
that we should have brought all our French prisoners here, and
that we then joyntly should have gone to Canada to release our
prisoners, but this was not done which grieved us, we would faine
have gone hand in hand and loosed the prisoners.3o
Although the Iroquois wanted help in getting the
prisoners back, they did not want it done for them. They
were not children in the Euro-American sense, nor were
they subjects.
Euro-Americans were aware that this was a sensitive
matter. In 1749, New York Governor Clinton informed
William Johnson that he must:
32. See Lawrence H. Leder, Pennsylvania History: The Livingston Indian
Records, 1661-1723, 23 J. PA. HIST. A'SSN 29, 44 (1956); Jacob Jameson,
Answers to Governor Cass' Questions, 16 ETHNOHISTORY 132 (1969). See
generally, Patricia Galloway, "The Chief Who Is Your Father": Choctaw and
French Views of the Diplomatic Relation, in POWHATAN'S MANTLE 254-78 (Peter
H. Wood et al. eds., 1989).
33. See BRODHEAD, supra note 31, at 492-95, 567-73.
34. See id.
35. Id. at 569.
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[L]et them [the Iroquois] know that my calling them Subjects of
the Great King of Great Britain cannot in any Sense be construed
to their Prejudice since all the Gov' of New York are the King's
Subjects, & they have always acknowledged themselves to be
Brethren to the English and Children of the Great King...36
Use of the term "subject" was acceptable to the Iroquois
so long as they were children or subjects on their own
terms." European efforts to interpret it differently were to
no avail. Moreover, both the English and the French
refused to recognize the others' claims that the Iroquois
were subjects of the other. 8
Meanwhile, the Iroquois were also making their
position vis-A-vis other nations known in still other ways. A
declaration of sovereignty was made in 1684 by an Iroquois
speaker to the Governor of Virginia. After confirming that
the Iroquois had put part of the Susquehanna River under
the protection of the King of England in order to preserve it,
the speaker stated "wee having noe other land to leave to
our Wives and Children, and lett your Friend that lives
over the great Lake [King Charles of England] know that
wee are a free People uniting ourselves to what Sachem we
please ....
In 1701, the Iroquois asserted their sovereignty again,
by their actions in negotiating separately with the French
and English for neutrality. The Iroquois did not consider
themselves to be subjects of any nation."
As the numbers of Europeans on the North American
continent increased, the Iroquois were anxious to form
alliances. These alliances would provide the Iroquois with
36. 6 JOHN ROMEYN BRODHEAD, DOcuMENTs RELATIVE TO THE COLONIAL
HISTORY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 507 (E.B. O'Callaghan ed., 1855).
37. The Iroquois sense of the relationship was made especially clear by the
Seneca chiefs in a speech delivered in Philadelphia, December 1, 1790.
Blackstone stated "When you gave us peace, we called you father, because you
promised to secure us in the possession of our lands." CHAINBREAKER: THE
REVOLUTIONARY WAR MEMOIRS OF GOVERNOR BLACKSNAKE AS TOLD TO BENJAMIN
WILLIAMS 238 (Thomas S. Abler ed., 1989) [hereinafter CHAINBREAKER].
38. See Howard Berman, Perspectives on American Indian Sovereignty and
International Law, 1600-1776, in EXILED, supra note 1 at 141-42, 150, 171-73.
39. Proposition of the Onondaga and Cayuga sachems made at the town hall
of Albany before Lord Howard of Bingham, Governor of Virginia and Colonel
Thomas Dunqoin, upon the 2d day of August, 1684; Gwynn Diary (July 30, 1684
to Aug. 5, 1684) (on file with the Buffalo Law Review).
40. See AQUILA, supra note 25, at 45-69; Branddo & Starna, supra note 25,
at 209-44.
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military aid against their enemies, make trade goods more
easily accessible, and bury hostilities between them and the
newcomers. In 1694, the Iroquois attempted to mediate
between the French and the English in an effort to get both
to join in chains of friendship with them.4 As the speaker
Teganissorens stated in 1694 in a message from the Five
Nations to the French,
The Iroquois desire their message to be transmitted over the sea,
and carried even to the Kings of France and of England,
particularly to the King of France, in order that he, himself,
may... grant them, if in his power, such a peace as they desire,
that is, generally; not only between all the Indians but between all
their relations, especially between the Kings of France and
England; and they request that they may have an answer as soon
42
as possible.
The Iroquois were never successful in establishing such
a broad reaching alliance. Meanwhile, they attempted to
cultivate separate alliances with both the French and the
English. This proved difficult, as neither nation understood
that an alliance was a living relationship which needed to
be frequently renewed." The French attempted twice, once
in 1665 and again in 1687, to assert dominance over the
Iroquois by conquest. Other times, the French did their best
to ensure Iroquois neutrality. The English were a source of
continual frustration to the Iroquois. They professed to be
allies, yet frequently failed to live up to the expectations
that the Iroquois had of them. For example, the English
failed to provide cheap and abundant trade goods, to aid
them in wars against their enemies and to protect their
borders.44 As a Mohawk Chief stated in 1702 after renewing
the Covenant Chain,
[Wie must beg leave to inform you that we have had but little
assistance from our Brethren during ye late warr, we have been
41. See 9 JAMES RoMEYN BRODHEAD, DOCUMENTS RELATIVE TO THE COLONIAL
HIS-TORY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 79-80 (E.B. O'Callaghan ed., 1855).
42. Id.
43. See Mary A. Druke, Iroquois Treaties: Common Forms, Varying
Interpretations, in THE HISTORY AND CULTURE OF IROQUOIS DIPLOMACY: AN
INTERDISCIPLINARY GUIDE TO THE TREATIES OF THE Six NATIONS AND THEIR
LEAGUE 85-98 (Francis Jennings et al. eds., 1985).
44. See 7 JAMES ROMEYN BRODHEAD, DOCUMENTS RELATIVE TO THE COLONIAL
HISTORY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 189 (E.B. O'Callaghan ed., 1855).
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forced to wage war alone & lost many of our people but see none of
our Brethren either to assist us or to revenge the blood of those we
had lost by ye French.
45
He went on to say:
You demand the reason why our Indians goe to Canada, that is
easily answered, for in ye first place the goods are cheaper there
than here, & ye Elk & mouse skins are a better comodity there
than here... and we are oftentimes not fairly dealt with by ye
Traders.... And in answer to what you say, which wd be the best
means to Retreive our Indians bak from Canada, lett ye Goods be
cheaper and then there is no doubt, but they will return very
speedly.
46
This expresses the Iroquois' expectations of an alliance.
Allies were to strengthen each other, to open doors and to
bring about results.
Evidence of misinterpretations by Euro-Americans of
the nature of their relationships with the Iroquois is strewn
throughout history. In the case of the sovereignty claims by
France and Great Britain over the Iroquois, the postures
taken by both were clearly facades which they were not able
to sustain.47 Claims of sovereignty over the Iroquois did not
end with the cessation of the Seven Years War in 1760, nor
did they end with the disappearance of French government
from Northeastern North America. Rather, these claims
have continued to the present day.48  Each of the
governmental bodies interacting with the Iroquois have
recognized the relations as ones of alliance.4' However, they
often interpret that alliance as being skewed. The Iroquois,
along with other American Indian nations, are often
considered to be domestic dependent nations or wards.0 On
45. BRODHEAD, supra note 31, at 987.
46. See id.
47. See Howard Berman, Perspectives on American Indian Sovereignty and
International Law, 1600-1776, in EXILED, supra note 1, at 149-52, 175-86.
48. See UPTON, supra note 2, at 142-61; Jack Campisi, National Policy,
State's Rights, and Indian Sovereignty: The Case of the New York Iroquois, in
IROQUOIAN STUDIES, supra note 2, at 95-108.
49. See Howard Berman, Perspectives on American Indian Sovereignty and
International Law, 1600-1776, in EXILED, supra note 1, at 128-29; Mary Druke
Becker, Iroquois and Iroquoian in Canada, in NATIVE PEOPLES: THE CANADIAN
EXPERIENCE 323-46 (R. Bruce Morrison & C. Roderick Wilson eds., 1986)
[hereinafter NATIVE PEOPLES].
50. See Jack Campisi, National Policy, State's Rights, and Indian Soy-
992 [Vol. 46
1998] HISTORY OF IROQUOIS SOVEREIGNTY
the other hand, the Iroquois characterize the alliance as
being one of independent parties, equal in stature and
moral authority, if not in military power.5 Over time, the
Iroquois have persistently put forth their position. They
have consistently pushed for a renewal of the chain of
friendship. Euro-Americans, however, have not listened, or
have chosen not to listen.52
After the Seven Year's War, the British became even
less reliable allies.53 They still used the term subjects to
refer to Indians and continued to regard them as children.54
The Iroquois rejected these designations, except under
specific terms exemplified in the following speech of the
English Superintendent of Indian Affairs, William Johnson,
delivered for him by a Kahnawake Iroquois speaker to the
Western Indians:
Regard the King of England as our Common Father, who is willing
to Live in Peace, and Friendship, with all his Children the
Indians, and intends to Establish a fair, and reasonable Trade
with all Indian Nations in His American Dominions.-IHe does not
mean to claim your Lands as His Property; and desires no more
Privileges than the King of France had, which is, to carry on the
Trade among You, for your own Good, and Welfare ....
In general, Indians objected to the outcome of the
Treaty of Paris between France and England at the end of
the Seven Years War. As frontiersman George Croghan re-
ported, "[Tihey say the French had no Right to give up their
Country to the English." Reports that the Indians received
about the subsequent Proclamation of 1763, placing
substantial restrictions on settlements westward of borders
defined by Indian treaties, gave them some confidence that
the onslaught of encroaching settlers would be slowed, if
ereignty: The Case of the New York Iroquois, in IROQUOIAN STUDIES, supra note
2, at 97-100, 103.
51. See Druke, supra note 17, at 33.
52. See Howard Berman, Perspectives on American Indian Sovereignty and
International Law, 1600-1776, in EXILED, supra note, 1 at 131-34; Druke
Becker, supra note 49.
53. 10 THE PAPERS OF SIR WILLIAM JOHNSON 678 (James Sullivan ed., 1965)
[hereinafter JOHNSON PAPERS].
54. 12 THE PAPERS OF SIR William JOHNSON 994-95 (James Sullivan ed.,
1965); 8 PUBLIC PAPERS OF GEORGE CLINTON, FIRST GOVERNOR OF NEW YORK,
1777-1795, 1801, 1804, at 328-32 (1910).
55. JOHNSON PAPERS, supra note 53, at 793.
56. Id. at 660.
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not stopped." The 1768 Treaty at Fort Stanwix, defining a
boundary between the Iroquois and the English, was an
active step taken by the Iroquois to stem the tide of
encroaching Euro-Americans. 8
Domestic problems grew among Euro-Americans. The
Iroquois were gradually faced with deciding who held the
other side of the Covenant Chain, the British or the
Americans. During the American Revolution, the Iroquois
could not come to one opinion about whom to aid. Therefore,
they covered the council fire, temporarily suspending
negotiations, leaving each nation to act as it saw fit.
At the end of the war, the Iroquois, especially those who
supported the British, were enraged over the Treaty of
Paris and firmly denounced it. In 1783, Allan Maclean
wrote to Sir Frederick Haldimand:
The Indians from the Surmises they have heard of the Boundaries,
look upon our Conduct to them as treacherous and Cruel; they told
me they never could believe that our King could pretend to Cede to
America What was not his own to give, or that the Americans
would accept from Him, What he had no right to grant... that the
Boundaries... Settled... [at the Treaty at Fort Stanwix in 1768]
were agreeable to the Indians & the Colonies, & never had been
doubted or disputed since-That the Indians were a free People
Subject to no Power upon Earth, that they were the faithful Allies
of the King of England, but not his Subjects-that he had no right
Whatever to grant away to the States of America, their Rights or
properties without a manifest breach of all justice and Equity, and
they would not Submit to it... they would not be the Aggressors,
but they would defend their own just Rights or perish in the
attempt to the last Man .... 60
With the end of the American Revolution, pressure for
Iroquois land increased significantly.6' Despite the Treaty of
Paris, the United States determined it necessary to
57. DOROTHY JONES, LICENSE FOR EMPIRE: COLONIALISM BY TREATY IN EARLY
AMERICA 45-47, 74 (1982) (noting that when issuing the Proclamation of 1763,
the English entertained notions of empire, but recognized that they could not
keep the Indians from becoming hostile unless land was guaranteed to them).
See generally Philip Raphals, Nations Waiting, 69 CAN. F. 10, 10-14 (1991);
JACK M. SOSIN, WHITEWALL AND THE WILDERNESS 27-51 (1961).
58. See BRODHEAD, supra note 18, at 111-137.
59. See 5 PETER FORCE, AMERICAN ARCHIVES 1104 (1844).
60. THE VALLEY OF THE Six NATIONS 36-37 (Charles M. Johnston, ed., 1964).
61. 10 PENNSYLvANIA ARCHIVEs 119-24 (Samuel Hazard ed., 1949). See, e.g.,
26 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 150-55 (1784).
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negotiate with the Six Nations for their land.62 At the
Treaty of Fort Stanwix of 1784 and the Treaty of
Canandaigua of 1794, the Iroquois were under tremendous
pressure to cede land.63 Their rights to their land base,
however, were acknowledged insofar as cession of land was
negotiated. In a speech to the President of the United
States during January 1790, the Seneca chiefs'
Cornplanters, Half-Town and Big-Tree clearly expressed
their sense of alliances be-tween nations as living, working
relationships. They stated,
When we saw that we were deceived [by the British], and heard
the invitation which you gave us to draw near to the fire which
you kindled [at Fort Stanwix, 1784], and talk with you concerning
peace, we made haste towards it. You then told us that we were in
your hand, and that, by closing it, you would crush us to nothing,
and you demanded from us a great country, as the price of that
peace which you had offered us, as if our want of strength had
destroyed our rights; our chiefs had felt your power, and were
unable to contend against you, and they therefore gave up that
country. What they agreed to, has bound our nation; but your
anger against us must, by this time, be cooled; and, although our
strength has not increased, nor your power become less, we ask
you to consider calmly, Were the terms dictated to us by your
commissioners reasonable and just?64
They were, in essence, requesting a new negotiation of
the terms of the 1784 Fort Stanwix treaty. United States
President Thomas Jefferson dismissed this, saying that it
was not in his power to nullify a treaty. However, one of the
purposes of a subsequent treaty between the United States
and the Iroquois, the Treaty at Canadaigua in 1794, was to
address the issue of restoring Seneca land ceded at Fort
Stanwix in 1784.65
62. Proceedings of the Commission of Indian Affairs, Appointed by Law for
the Extinguish of Indian Titles in the State of New York (1861) (on file with
author).
63. See Treaty with the Six Nations at Fort Stanwix, supra note 14.
64. CHAINEREAKEP, supra note 37, at 215.
65. See id.; Fenton, supra note 7, at 622-706. It has been argued that the
Treaty at Canandaigua in 1794:
[M]arked a shift in the relationship between the Iroquois and the
United States. After Canadaigua, the tribes were never in a position to
threaten the nation. The change that had occurred was a transition
from independent indigenous nations, to what Justice Marshall was to
call, some forty years later, domestic dependent nations.
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In 1790, the United States Congress passed the Trade
and Intercourse Act "federally guaranteeing Indian land.""6
However, New York State insisted on exempting itself from
the Act and negotiated directly with Iroquois for land much
to the dismay of United States federal officials. ' The
Iroquois continued to evaluate Americans and British as
allies and pressed them to honor their alliances, spe-
cifically to uphold treaties made with them. For example,
Red Jacket, a Seneca, chastised the United States in
February 1810 for its failure to honor treaties." By acting
as allies, the Iroquois continued to assert sovereignty and
expected aid and assistance from their allies in return." In
1810, Red Jacket acknowledged this by recognizing the
rising conflict between the British and Americans and em-
phasizing the potential role of the Iroquois in it." He noted
that the Iroquois had sent wampum belts to Western Indian
nations requesting that they would keep "their minds
strong in their friendship with your Nation, and in the
event of a war between the white people to sit still on their
seats, and take no part on either side. So far our voice has
been heard, they have agreed to harken to our counsel, and
remain at peace with your Nation."7' Again, one sees the
working of alliance as a multifaceted linking of nations. 2 By
October 1813, the policy of neutrality had been forsaken by
at least some Iroquois. Red Jacket, while speaking at the
time for Indians of Buffalo Creek, expressed dissatisfaction
over the handling of Iroquois recruits in the War of 1812.
He stated that should anyone be unsure, "we are an Inde-
Campisi, supra note 2, at 64. I would argue that this may have been so,
according to United States officials. Iroquois, however, although they were well
aware of, and willing to acknowledge, the fact that they were no military match
to the United States government, they were not willing to concede equality in
moral authority and nationhood. Within Iroquois frameworks, nationhood and
alliance are not dependent upon military power and might.
66. Jack Campisi, National Policy, State's Rights, and Indian Sovereignty:
The Case of the New York Iroquois, in IROQUOIAN STUDIES, supra note 2, at 99;
Trade and Intercourse Act, ch. 33, 1 Stat. 137 (1790) (current version at 25
U.S.C. § 177 (1994)).
67. 24 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 262-64 (1784).
68. See RED AND WHITE ON THE NEW YORK FRONTIER 40-43 (Charles M.
Snyder ed., 1978) [hereinafter RED AND WHITE].
69. See id. at 36, 40-43.
70. See id. at 42.
71. Id.
72. See id.
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pendent Nation."73 He added that as an ally, "[w]e have
taken up arms in your favor."74
As the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries passed,
New York State became more aggressive in asserting con-
trol over Indian affairs. After the Treaty at Canadaigua in
1794, the United States government turned its attention
westward."5 This left New York free to try to push its way
into Iroquois affairs. The Iroquois protested to United
States representative Erastus Granger in 1806, when their
rights to free ferrying were ignored by the New York State
Legislature. 76 Reports from the late eighteenth and early
twentieth century newspapers in communities surrounding
Iroquois reservations provide evidence of Iroquois efforts to
assert their position of independence from state and federal
authority. In a collection of such reports, one chapter is
titled "They Heed Not the Law."77 One article, dated July
21, 1899 with the title "Indian Right to Hunt and Fish,"
begins, "[m]any of the Indians on the New York
Reservations have an idea that the state game and fish
laws do not apply to them-that they can hunt and fish as
they please, regardless of state restrictions.""8
During the early twentieth century, New York State
attempted to obtain civil and criminal jurisdiction over New
York Indians, including the Iroquois. 79 By 1952, it had been
granted both by federal statute. This was done without the
approval of the large majority of Iroquois, 81 and as a result,
these jurisdictions are frequently challenged by the Iro-
quois. For example, Irving Powless Jr., an Onondaga, in-
73. Id. at 72.
74. Id.
75. See JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, supra note 61; Jack
Campisi, National Policy, State's Rights and Indian Sovereignty: The Case of
New York Iroquois, in IROQUOIAN STUDIES, supra note 2, at 100. For a complete
copy of the Treaty at Canandaigua and subsequent treaties indicating the
United States' attention to westward expansion, see 2 INDIAN AFFAIRS: LAWS &
TREATIES (Charles J. Kappler ed., 1904)
76. See RED AND WHITE, supra note 68, at 36.
77. ANDRE LOPEZ, PAGANS IN OUR MIDST 25-72 (1979).
78. Id. at 55.
79. See UPTON, supra note 2, at 139-35.
80. Id. at 155.
81. See id. at 139-61. See generally Laurence M. Hauptman, Congress,
Plenary Power, and the American Indian, 1870-1992, in EXILED, supra note 1;
Jack Campisi, National Policy, State's Rights and Indian Sovereignty: The Case
of New York Iroquois, in IROQUOIAN STUDIES, supra note 2, at 95-108.
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sisted in 1970, " '[w]e are not citizens of the United States.
Our land is not part of the United States and it is not part
of New York state. Your laws do not apply and Federal laws
do not apply on this reservation [i.e., Onondaga].' ),82
The Iroquois won a definite victory in their "persistent.
* . concern for their being recognized as a nation,"83 when a
bill introduced into the United States Congress in 1948 was
defeated. 4 This bill attempted to negotiate a final settle-
ment of treaty obligations. As Helen M. Upton writes in The
Everett Report in Historical Perspective: The Indians of New
York:
Lafayette Kennedy, a Seneca, insisted that to change the 1794
treaty [the Treaty of Canadaigua, under terms of which annuities
are still paid to the Iroquois] both parties must agree. This line of
reasoning was, of course, in accord with the premise that each
party to a treaty is equally important regardless of their
comparative strengths.
The Iroquois were not about to agree to change the 1794
treaty.
During the colonial period, the Iroquois often petitioned
the King of England or his direct representatives when
relations with individual colonies went awry. After the
American Revolution, the federal government in the United
States, the British Crown and later, the Canadian federal
government, were often approached for help in resolving
issues that the Iroquois felt were not being adequately
solved in negotiations with state, provincial, or other local
forms of government.' Euro-Americans replaced the term
"subject" with "ward," but the implications were the same.
The use of a different term did not change the meaning 'you
are under our control.' 7 The Iroquois were aware of these
82. See Howard Berman, Perspectives on American Indian Sovereignty and
International Law, 1600-1776, in EXILED, supra note 1, at 166.
83. See UPTON, supra note 2, at 155.
84. Id. at 155-56.
85. Id. at 156.
86. See Minutes of the Provincial Council of Pennsylvania from the
Organization to the Termination of the Proprietary Government (Mar. 10, 1682-
Sept. 27, 1775). See also UPTON, supra note 2; Druke Becker, Iroquois and
Iroquoian in Canada, in NATIVE PEOPLES, supra note 49, at 323-46.
87. See Jack Campisi, National Policy, State's Rights, and Indian
Sovereignty: The Case of the New York Iroquois, in IROQUOIAN STUDIES, supra
note 2, at 103.
998 [Vol. 46
1998] HISTORY OF IROQUOIS SOVEREIGNTY
implications, and were careful to qualify the use of the
terms in their negotiations. They continued to make their
view of the relationship as an alliance known. The Iroquois
governments have considered themselves to be independ-
ent, distinct entities. Their dependence on their alliances is
very important to them. They often request the aid of
external governmental bodies in accomplishing their goals.
They do so, however, as allies, although requests have often
been interpreted as signs of dependency.88 Euro-Americans
have tried to act for, rather than with, the Iroquois.
Iroquois words and actions, however, continue to make it
clear that they do not accept this interpretation of the
relationships.89
Throughout history, in the complexity and richness of
their relations with other nations, Iroquois have shown that
international relations are living, working relationships
that merit from being renewed and reevaluated. The image
of relations between nations as a linking of arms or as a
chain symbolizes the Iroquois sense of these relations as
alliances among independent, equal partners. It encapsu-
lates both the independence and the unity of the parties
within the alliance. In the United States, individual Iro-
quois communities in the modern era are resting claims of
sovereignty on treaty relations with the confederacy in the
late eighteenth century, most notably those at Fort Stanwix
in 1784 and Canadaigua in 1794. They might also rest it on
the consistency and persistence of Iroquois assertions of
sovereignty over time. The historical development of mod-
ern Iroquois communities has been varied, yet all base
claims to sovereignty on long-standing historical roots that
stem from the Iroquois League or Confederacy.
88. See Druke Becker, supra note 49, at 323-46.
89. This paper deals almost exclusively with Iroquois residing within the
boundary of the United States following the American Revolution. Although
historical experiences have differed between Iroquois living in Canada and
those in the United States, a shared cultural heritage means that most, if not
all of the same interpretations of interrelationships apply within Canada. For a
detailed analysis of interpretations within Canada, see id. at 323-46.
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